Partial Strikes and National Labor Policy by Mittenthal, Richard
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 54 Issue 1 
1955 
Partial Strikes and National Labor Policy 
Richard Mittenthal 
Member, Michigan Bar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Mittenthal, Partial Strikes and National Labor Policy, 54 MICH. L. REV. 71 (1955). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1955] THE p ARTIAL STRIKE 71 
PARTIAL STRIKES AND NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 
Richard M ittenthal* 
T HE labor-management relationship is put to new tests and strains every year. Each party must continually adjust to the 
other's innovations. So, unions must adapt policy to the reality of an 
increased concentration of industrial power through mergers and to 
the sweeping and unknown possibilities inherent in large scale 
automation. Management too must adapt policy to the fact of a 
united labor movement brought on by a different kind of merger 
and to the ever-increasing desire for greater job security as reflected 
today by demands for a guaranteed annual wage. These are merely 
illustrations. The search for new policy which will be responsive 
to the needs of present day unionists is a continuing one. 
Among the more interesting, although seldom explored, areas 
of policy is that relating to strike technique. Strikes, being the 
creatures of men, are completely adaptable to a great variety of 
situations. Depending upon the objective, a union's overall strat-
egy may include not only different types of strikes but also in each 
strike different degrees of militancy, different forms of picketing 
and different conceptions of timing. For example, strikes may be 
described in terms of either their ends-organizational, economic, 
and sympathy strikes-or their means-total, partial, peaceful, and 
violent strikes. And the ends will sometimes determine the means. 
It is customary to speak of strikes in their broad, generic sense 
without considering the fact that there are many subtle variants to 
traditional strike tactics. This article concerns itself with one such 
variant-the partial strike. The frequency with which unions use 
this technique is not known. No sound basis exists for making any 
estimate. However, the scarcity of reported cases in this area inti-
mates that the partial strike is today what it has always been, an 
anomalous practice. Whether it will remain so in the future is a 
matter of speculation. 
Before proceeding further with this analysis, let me define my 
subject. A partial strike is precisely what the term suggests. It is 
part strike, part work. Ordinarily, a union chooses between two 
obvious alternatives. Its members decide either to strike or to 
work. Between these poles there is a twilight area where the 
members may attempt to do both. In that area, we find the partial 
strike. Indeed, there are also different kinds of partial strikes-
• Member, Michigan Bar.-Ed. 
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those where strike and work coincide in point of time and those 
where strike and work are separate in point of time. One commen-
tator described the partial strike "as an attempt by employees to 
bring economic pressure against their [ or another] employer in 
order to obtain a change in their [ or others'] conditions of employ-
ment, while at the same time remaining actively at work."1 So 
defined, the partial strike clearly encompasses such diverse tactics 
as a refusal to perform specific work, a slowdown, and a refusal to 
cross a picket line. In all three instances, strike and work coincide 
in point of time. These strikes involve employees who refuse to 
perform part of their duties while remaining on the employer's 
premises and on his payroll.2 
The quoted definition, however, fails to include other forms of 
partial strikes which take place off of company premises and which 
do not involve a demand for pay for time not worked. Consider, 
for instance: refusals to work overtime and intermittent work stop-
pages. In both situations, strike and work are separate in point of 
time. It is these types of partial strikes with which I am primarily 
concerned. Through the years, these phenomena have been given 
assorted labels which describe their impact with greater specificity. 
For example, we know of the intermittent strike, the hit-and-run 
strike, the "overtime strike,"3 the weekend strike, and the instal-
ment plan strike. All are partial strikes because the union succes-
sively strikes and works and continues that pattern, withdrawing 
its members from the employment relationship for only a part of 
the scheduled work day, work week, or even work month.4 The 
conventional total strike, however, contemplates a complete with-
drawal of employees and a continuing refusal to work until a settle-
ment of the underlying causes of the walkout is made. In compar-
ing the two concepts, one can see that the essence of this kind of 
partial strike is intermittency. That is, the presence of employees 
1 Kelsey, "Partial Strikes," NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON 
LABOR 281-303 (1953). 
2 The refusal to cross a picket line has only this latter characteristic. At the outset, it 
should be made clear that only those employees whose work assignment requires them to 
cross picket lines at other than their own place of employment and who nevertheless respect 
such picket lines could be considered partial strikers. By the same token, employees who 
refuse to cross picket lines at their own plant and thus perform none of their work tasks 
cannot in any sense be regarded as partial strikers. 
3 Refusal to work overtime. 
4 Compare the "whipsaw strike"-a strike against one member of a multi-employer 
bargaining unit-which is not partial in nature because the union completely withdraws 
employees from one employer. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954). 
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on the job is merely temporary and is punctuated by recurring 
work stoppages. 
Some authorities have argued that "partial strike" is a misnomer 
and a contradiction in terms.11 In their view, a partial strike is not 
in fact a "strike" and should not be entitled to any of the legal 
benefits and protections which may stem from a strike status. That 
argument is discredited today, especially because of the broad defi-
nitions which were incorporated in the amended National Labor 
Relations Act.6 In Title V, section 50 l (2) of the act, Congress said: 
"The term 'strike' includes any strike or other concerted stoppage 
of work by employees ... and any concerted slowdown or other 
concerted interruption of operations by employees." 
It should be emphasized that these definitions are significant 
for other than academic reasons. Because the rights which strikers 
possess under the act seem to turn on, among other things, the dif-
ference between a total strike and a partial strike, the distinction 
between the two is crucial. The total strike, assuming it is peace-
ful and for a lawful objective, carries a stamp of legitimacy and a 
grant of legal protection while the partial strike results in a brand 
of impropriety and a loss of legal protection. These thoughts will 
be developed in greater detail later in the article. But this pre-
liminary observation will give the reader some conception of the 
legal consequences of this distinction. 
Application: When Is the Stoppage a Partial Strike'! 
While these definitions may seem simple in theory, they have 
proved quite difficult in application. True, the problem is pri-
marily a factual one. It nevertheless has some intriguing features. 
Certain partial strikes-refusals to perform specific work and refus-
als to cross picket lines-easily fit the definition. Such refusals are 
facts which are both seen and heard. The existence of these strikes 
is thus susceptible to direct proofs. Few nuances are possible. 
Slowdowns, however, do pose difficulties. For they are usually 
surreptitious, seldom overt. Because of this, direct proofs are often 
unattainable. Proof will usually turn on one element of circum-
stantial evidence-an otherwise unexplainable decline in produc-
tion. Any such inquiry will lead inevitably into many other ques-
tions in the production area, such as the normal level of production, 
the extent of the decline, and the uniformity of the decline. 
Ii See, e.g., C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1939) 108 F. (2d) 390. 
6 61 Stat. L. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§141-197. 
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Equally interesting is the problem with respect to intermittent 
stoppages. When a union regularly calls its members off the job 
for one hour on each work day, it can hardly be questioned that 
the union is engaged in a partial strike. But as the time interval 
between stoppages increases, the likelihood of the stoppages being 
a partial strike decreases. Could anyone seriously characterize two 
stoppages more than a year apart as a partial strike? If not, then 
how should we characterize stoppages one day a month or one day 
every six months? Arbitrary distinctions between partial and total 
strikes based solely on time considerations offer no real solution. 
Where su<;=cessive stoppages, however far apart, are an integral part 
of a continuing single strike plan, the union doubtless intended a 
partial strike. Proof of such a plan, however, might be quite diffi-
cult, especially where there had been a considerable time lapse 
between stoppages. 
On the other hand, can a union be engaged in a partial strike 
even though it has called but one stoppage? Recently, the National 
Labor Relations Board split 3-2 in answering this question in the 
affirmative.7 The majority felt that the coincidence of a single 
refusal by employees to work overtime and an intention to con-
tinue such practice amounted to a partial strike. It held that the 
record established both "the union's plan to engage in a series of 
partial strikes and its effectuation of that plan." The dissent, how-
ever, argued that a partial strike is a "continuing and recurring 
refusal to work the hours set by an employer." And, as there was 
but one stoppage, which by itself must be considered perfectly 
proper, the dissent concluded that the employees were adjudged 
partial strikers only because they intended to continue to refuse to 
work overtime hours. If a second stoppage had occurred, the Board 
apparently would have been unanimous in describing the activity 
as a partial strike. On balance, the majority's view would seem to 
be more realistic. The dissent's position that there must be at leas·t 
two stoppages before there is a partial strike seems unduly mechan-
1st1c. The dissenting opinion was mainly concerned with the 
majority's allegedly equating the intention to engage in a partial 
strike with the strike itself. In this regard, the dissent's fears seem 
unfounded, for nowhere in the majority opinion is there any sug-
gestion that the same result would be reached absent proof of one 
7 Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589 (1954). 
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actual stoppage. Thus, a union's intentions have become decidedly 
relevant in determining whether or not a partial strike situation 
exists. 
Motivation 
One might well wonder why the partial strike warrants discus-
sion. Surely, its history shows little, if any, acceptance by union 
policy makers. What then are the motivating factors which will 
impel unions to attempt a partial, rather than a total, strike? And 
are these factors of such general application as to presage an in-
crease in the use of this tactic? Once again the intermittent work 
stoppage is my main focus of attention. I conceive of three funda-
mental situations where this form of partial strike may prove 
valuable to a union. 
First, there is the problem created by large scale "automation." 
Technological advances promise startling new developments in the 
automatic machinery, electronics, and machine tool industries. 
The new machines will replace men in the direction and control 
of other machines. This augurs a change in the composition of our 
labor force. Today's production line worker will be tomorrow's 
maintenance worker. His sole function will be to service machines 
which by themselves will carry out the entire production process. 
In one sense, this is no revolution. Innovations in automatic 
equipment have been a continuous feature of our mass production 
environment, especially in the oil refining, chemical, food pack-
aging and bottling industries, all of which are now highly auto-
mated. True, other industries which require considerable assem-
bly work or which experience frequent periodic variation in the 
characteristics of their product will resist automation as being ini-
tially too expensive or uneconomical. In time, even their objec-
tions are likely to be overcome. 
One of the significant features of the automated plant may be 
its power to resist strike pressures. Production may well continue 
during a strike when the producers are automated machines. These 
machines will not only be unresponsive to a union strike vote but 
will also often run without their usual complement of employees. 
Continued production may be dependent on no more than a stand-
by maintenance force. While supervisory and office clerical person-
nel are generally not adaptable to traditional production line opera-
tions, they may be able to handle the maintenance chores posed by 
an automated plant. This is not to say that most automated plants 
can operate without their maintenance men. Different industries 
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will have different experiences in this area. Still, the more inde-
pendent the machines are of human supervision, the greater the 
likelihood that the plant can continue to operate under strike con-
ditions. Automation thus in some instances may result in a com-
pany's power to "hold out" being immeasurably enhanced. In such 
circumstances, a union's power to shut down production is throt-
tled. The traditional total strike would be unable to evoke the 
economic pressures which warrant its use. Unions may have to look 
to new strike techniques to use against the automated company. 
And the intermittent work stoppage would have strong recom-
mendations as a tactic designed to neutralize a company's advantage 
in automated equipment. For that kind of partial strike would 
exert a maximum of pressure with a minimum of risk. Certain 
disruptions accompany the inception of any strike situation and 
inevitably cause some production loss to the company. And that 
loss would be multiplied by the total number of stoppages which 
take place. Moreover, the severity of the loss in relation to any 
particular stoppage might depend upon whether or not the com-
pany is forewarned of the union's strike plans. In this way the 
union could harass an employer without putting itself through a 
prolonged and fruitless total strike. 
There is some evidence that this causal relation between auto-
mation and partial strikes has actually existed between the Bell 
Telephone Company and the Communication Workers of Amer-
ica.8 The introduction of automatic dialing equipment in the 
telephone industry has made the traditional stri~e ineffective. As 
the telephone company is able to continue at least its local service 
during a strike situation, it can without serious injury to itself with-
stand a lengthy total strike by the CWA. As an ·alternative, this 
union devised its version of an intermittent work stoppage. It 
periodically struck the telephone company at unexpected times 
and places, each stoppage lasting for a relatively brief period of 
time. Many of the company's offices were struck two or three times. 
In this way, the union was able to disrupt substantially the com-
pany's operations. Employees, affiliated with other unions, refused 
to cross the picket lines and the company was unable to marshal its 
reserve strength with sufficient speed to fill the vacant jobs. As the 
stoppages lasted only a short time, the employees were returning 
to their jobs by the time the company had consummated its emer-
gency measures. The company "was hard put to maintain tele-
s See Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1954). 
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phone services in the face of the intermittent loss of" employees. 
The strategy behind the union's tactics was described in its own 
publication: 
"Why is the 'hit-and-run' tactic successful? Let's take stock. 
"By adopting the surprise hit-and-run picket line, the 
union taxes management's ability to organize its offices to the 
utmost. The chain of command in the telephone company is 
a long one. And telephone supervision is well trained to use 
no initiative-but wait for orders from the top. 
"By striking quickly and unexpectedly, the Company has a 
problem getting its defenses set up. They can't spare super-
visors from other non-struck areas, because they have to carry 
on normal work. The ones they do gather together reach the 
picketed place, only to have the picket line gone. 
"The Telephone Company can't function efficiently in its 
nation-wide operations if any part of its circulation is cut off. 
During a full blown strike all of its operations operate in low 
gear-but in a hit-and-run attack, most of the company's func-
tions must be maintained. The company accounting records 
must be maintained, its workers are largely on the job, and the 
public expects normal service. 
"Another advantage for the union in this tactic is that most 
of the workers are on the job, maintaining their financial take 
home while harassing the company into a state of confusion. 
Having suffered no great loss, these workers can aid the men 
and women who are off the job all the time of the strike. 
"The Hit and Run strike will beat the telephone industry 
-if properly applied."9 
Implicit in the Union's comment is the realization that the 
traditional total strike could not produce sufficient pressure to 
win the desired economic concessions. Thus, the emergence of the 
hit-and-run strike technique. 
There is a second, quite obvious motivation behind the use of 
the intermittent stoppage. Those unions which are ill-equipped, 
financially or organizationally, to enter a total strike situation may 
find in this particular weapon a workable middle ground. The 
striking union with limited resources has two objectives. It must 
of course assert real pressure and at the same time it must conserve 
9 Id. at 1548, n. 3, quoting COAST Co-ORDINATOR (official CWA publication) Nov. 20, 
1950. 
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its resources. The intermittent stoppage may well satisfy both re-
quirements. It obviously will harass a company and deprive it 
of some income. But, more important, it may avoid a protracted 
and costly test of strength. While it deprives the strikers of some 
income, it does not cut off their entire earnings. In such a situa-
tion, the employer is in a sense underwriting the striking employ-
ees. By contrast, a total strike leaves the strikers without income 
and taxes the union's treasury for all kinds of strike expenditures. 
Some of these very factors were behind a recent series of weekend 
bus strikes by the Transit Workers Union of Hawaii.10 One of the 
reasons for that partial strike was the union's desire "to turn the 
tables on the [bus company] by depriving [it] of some income 
while the employees could have some force and still have in-
come. "11 
Finally, there is excellent reason for utility unions to embrace 
intermittent work stoppages. These unions must of necessity be 
sensitive to public opinion. For it is the public which is always 
either inconvenienced or injured by a utility work stoppage. Al-
though public opinion will not by itself determine the outcome 
of such a strike, it may often be one of the' decisive factors. At-
tempts to enlist the public's sympathy are therefore a characteris-
tic of disputes in this area. If the union can win public support 
through thoughtful consideration of the public's needs, its chances 
of strike success are improved. For example, it may attempt to 
minimize a disruption in service by striking for only part of a 
scheduled work day or work week. Without such consideration, the 
public's hostility will likely be against whichever side initiated its 
discomfiture, usually the union. Even absent elements of self-
interest, the union may, as a matter of principle and social respon-
sibility, oppose total stoppages which tend to cripple the commun-
ity where partial stoppages are feasible. This is illustrated by the 
Transit Workers Union of Hawaii who called weekend bus strikes 
in order "to give service to the public during the week so that 
children could get to school and others could get to work." 
Other partial strikes are born of entirely different motivations. 
For instance, refusals to perform specific work often result from 
so-called "hot cargo" clauses in collective bargaining agreements. 
Employees are given the contractual right to refuse to handle the 
goods of a non-unionized employer. When this "hot cargo" ar-
10 Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1806 (1954). 
11 Ibid. Trial Examiner Hemingway's Intermediate Report, p. 5, n. 5. 
1955] THE p ARTIAL STRIKE 79 
rives on the plant premises, the employees refuse to touch it. This 
type of conduct, however, is more likely to appear before the Board 
as an alleged secondary boycott than as an alleged partial strike. 
Slowdowns are a pressure tactic which could spring from numerous 
causes. In piecework wage systems, slowdowns are sometimes di-
rected against production standards set by a company's time stud-
ies. On such occasions, the slowdown is a sub rosa attempt to 
prove that a production standard is in error or is unrealistic. But 
more often this device is merely a pressure tactic to win an argu-
ment over some condition of employment. 
Statutory and Policy Consideration-Are All Strikes Protected? 
What are some of the legal consequences of the partial strike? 
Is it to be treated like any other strike? Is it to be considered a pro-
tected or an unprotected concerted activity? In order to answer 
these questions, I must first detail the relevant statutory considera-
tions. Section 7 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (1947) 
provides, in part, "Employees shall have the right to self-organi-
zation, to form, join, or assist labor organizations . . . and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " (Emphasis add-
ed.) Section 8 (a) (1) forbids employer interference, restraint, or 
coercion of employees in the exercise of any of these rights. Section 
8 (a) (3) forbids employer discrimination against employees which 
is aimed at either encouraging or discouraging union membership. 
And section 13 states, "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically 
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere 
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to 
affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." Together, 
these sections constitute the congressional guarantee of the right 
to strike. Elsewhere, in sections 8 (b) and 8 (d), the Congress 
placed certain substantive and procedural restrictions on the right 
to strike. Sections 7 and 8 make no other distinction between dif-
ferent types of concerted activities. Assuming then that a strike 
in no way violates section 8 (b) or 8 (d), does it nevertheless fall 
within the protection of sections 7, 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3)? While 
a strike is the most obvious form of concerted activity, it has long 
been held that not all strikes will be protected by these provisions 
against employer reprisal. Statutory construction permits the mo-
dification of express language -"concerted activities"- where its 
literal application would lead to absurd results or results inconsis-
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tent with the intent of Congress. For example, sit-down strikes 
and other seizures of plant property are concerted union activities 
but are also trespasses in violation of law. To protect such strikes 
against employer interference would be to sanction such illegality. 
Any such result would be foreign to the policy objectives of the 
act. In its declaration of policy, Congress stated that one of its 
purposes was ... "to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for 
preventing the interference by either [ union or employer] with 
the legitimate rights of the other .... " 
As early as 1939, the United States Supreme Court declared 
that the protection of the act did not extend to all forms of con-
certed activities in labor disputes. The Court was concerned partic-
ularly with illegal union activity. It ruled that employees who 
engage in "sitdown strikes"12 or in acts amounting to mutiny18 
are without the protection of the act, notwithstanding the fact that 
such conduct, literally construed, constituted a "concerted act-
ivity." 
Although the illegal strike is thus unprotected, it does not fol-
low that all legal strikes are protected. For some legal strikes are 
so contrary to the policies of the act that Congress could not have 
intended to give such activities immunity from employer inter-
ference. A strike in violation of a no-strike clause is an example 
of a legal strike held to be outside the protection of the act. The 
Board has embraced this dichotomy. It affirms the rights of only 
those strikers who are engaged in protected concerted activity; it 
denies its facilities to those strikers who are engaged in unprotected 
concerted activity. This administrative graft onto the language of 
section 7 is not seriously questioned by anyone today. The only 
problems arise from the Board's policy determinations as to the 
kind of union conduct which will be classified as either protected 
or unprotected activity. In making such policy, the Board general-
ly asked itself one question: was the strike illegal or otherwise so 
indefensible that Congress could not have intended that employees 
engaging in such activity be protected under section 7 of the act? 
This issue in turn seems to be partly controlled by the degree to 
which the particular strike departs from a legal or traditional 
norm. If the strike is held unprotected, then the parties are left 
12 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 59 S.Ct. 490 (1939), reversing 
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930 (1938). 
13 Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 62 S.Ct. 886 (1942), reversing South-
ern Steamship Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 26 (1940). 
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to their own devices. If it is held protected, the employer cannot 
discharge or otherwise discipline the strikers without violating the 
act. 
Partial Strikes and the Law 
The history of partial strikes before the Board and the courts 
is brief indeed. Few cases need be examined to get a complete 
picture of the evolution in the treatment of these strikes.14 In its 
early days, the Board considered all peaceably conducted strikes 
as within the protection of the act. No employer was allowed to 
discharge or discipline employees who were engaged in such a 
strike. The Board drew no distinction between the traditional 
total strike and the variants described here as partial strikes.15 
Partial strikers received the same measure of protection as any 
other striker. Apparently, to use the phrase of the Board, this 
kind of activity was not thought "so indefensible" as to incur a 
forfeiture of the protection of the act. The courts, however, were 
in complete disagreement with the Board. The very concerted ac-
tivities which the Board found protected, the Supreme Court 
found unprotected. 16 Nor were the courts of appeals more kindly 
disposed toward the Board's rulings. 
Refusals to Work Overtime 
In the Conn case,17 the Seventh Circuit dealt with the ques-
tion of whether an employer might discharge employees who, al-
though willing to work the regular hours, had refused to work the 
scheduled overtime hours. Their refusal was underscored by one 
actual work stoppage during overtime hours. The following day, 
the employer discharged those employees who persisted in refusing 
to work overtime. The Board held that the employees had engaged 
in a concerted protest against the prevailing overtime and that 
this concerted activity amounted to a strike-refusing to work in 
14 A detailed and thoughtful analysis of these cases can be found in Kelsey, "Partial 
Strikes," NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 281-303 (1953). 
15 See, e.g., Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676 (1938); C. G. Conn, Ltd., 10 N.L.R.B. 
498 (1938); Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 46 N.L.R.B. 714 (1943). This last case indicated, 
however, that an employer need not allow employees to return to work, where they had 
refused to work overtime, until they indicated a willingness to work on the employer's 
terms. But discharge was not allowed if the employees' refusal amounted to a concerted 
activity aimed at obtaining a change in their conditions of employment. 
16 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 12 and 13 supra. 
11 C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1935) 108 F. (2d) 390. See, to the same 
effect, Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. v. NLRB, (6th Cir. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 262. 
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excess of 48 hours per week. 18 And, presumably, as these strikers 
fell within the protection of section 7, their discharges were not 
warranted. In reversing the Board, withdrawing the protection of 
section 7 from these employees and sustaining their discharges, 
the court stated: 
"We are of the opinion that the facts in the instant situa-
tion do not bring the discharged employees within this or any 
other definition of the word 'strike' of which we are aware. 
We are unable to accept ... [the Board's] argument to the 
effect that an employee can be on a strike and at work simul-
taneously. We think he must be on the job subject to the 
authority and control of the employer, or off the job as a 
striker, in support of some grievance. . . . 
"Undoubtedly, when ... [the employer] refused to com-
ply with ... [the employees'] request [for an increase in over-
time rates], there were two courses open. First, they could 
continue work, and negotiate further with ... [the employer], 
or, second, they could strike in protest. They did neither, or 
perhaps it would be more accurate to say they attempted to 
do both at the same time. . . . 
"We are aware of no law or logic that gives the employee 
the right to work upon terms prescribed solely by him. That 
is plainly what was sought to be done in this instance. It is 
not a situation in which employees ceased work in protest 
against conditions imposed by the employer, but one in which 
the employees sought and intended to continue work upon 
their own notion of the terms which should prevail. If they 
had a right to fix the hours of their employment, it would 
follow that a similar right existed by which they could pre-
scribe all conditions and regulations affecting their employ-
ment." 19 
The impact of this case has been pronounced. An analysis of 
subsequent Board and court decisions in this area reveals the per-
vasive influence of the Seventh Circuit's theory. 
Intermittent Work Stoppages 
Equally significant in the growth of theory relating to the 
partial strike was the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
UAW-AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board. 20 In this 
18 C. G. Conn, Ltd., 10 N.L.R.B. 498 (1938). 
19 C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1935) 108 F. (2d) 390 at 397. 
20 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949). 
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case, the union called a series of "intermittent and unannounced 
work stoppages." The employer was not informed of any specific 
demand which these tactics were designed to enforce. Without 
disciplining the employees, the employer .asked the Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board for relief under the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Peace Act. When the requested relief was granted in the form 
of a cease and desist order, the union appealed to the Supreme 
Court contending that the relief granted under the Wisconsin act 
conflicted with the guarantee of the right to engage in concerted 
activities provided by section 7 of the NLRA. The Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal, ruling that section 7 did not protect all 
union activities merely because they were concerted. Rather, the 
Court said, the aim of section 7 was simply to insure that tradition-
al, conventional labor action should never again be comprehen-
sively outlawed. Section 7 could not be extended into a blanket 
immunity for all kinds of concerted labor activity. If such im-
munity were granted, then management, in the Court's own 
words, "would be disabled from any kind of self-help to cope with 
these coercive tactics of the union except to submit to its unde-
clared demands. "21 
Refusal to Perform Specific Work 
During this same period, another form of partial strike was 
being explored for the first time. Situations arose in which em-
ployees were unwilling to perform all of the duties of their jobs. 
Without engaging in any formal strike action, they refused to 
perform a particular part of their assigned work. In Montgomery 
Ward & Co.22 the Board held that the employees' refusal to process 
orders from a struck plant of their employer constituted "lawful 
assistance of their union protected by section 7 of the act." The 
Board felt that although they had not actually struck, these em-
ployees assumed a position analogous to that of economic strikers 
and as such they could be replaced, but not discharged. Their 
discharges were accordingly unlawful. On appeal, the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed the Board's order and sustained the discharges. 23 In 
so holding, the court in essence found the employees to be disobe-
21 Id. at 264. 
22 64 N.L.R.B. 433 at 445. Note also, Pinaud, 51 N.L.R.B. 235 (1943), where the Board 
held that an employee who continued during a strike to perform her pre-strike functions, 
but refused to perform work that had been done by strikers, might properly be ordered 
to leave the plant. However, thereafter she was an economic striker not subject to discharge. 
23 NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., (8th Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 486. 
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dient non-strikers in breach of their implied promise to perform 
their work faithfully and satisfactorily. Its rationale is best expres-
sed in this excerpt: 
" ... Any employee may, of course, be lawfully discharged 
for disobedience of the employer's directions in breach of his 
contract .... While these employees had the undoubted right 
to go on a strike and quit their employment, they could not 
continue to work and remain at their positions, accept the 
wages paid them, and at the same time select what part of their 
allotted tasks they cared to perform of their own volition, or 
refuse openly or secretly, to the employer's damage, to do 
other work." 24 
In the Home Beneficial Life Insurance Co. case25 the Com-
pany had a rule requiring salesmen to report at the office at the 
beginning of each day's work. After unsuccessful negotiations to 
alter this rule, the union notified the company that the salesmen 
would only report in two days of each week. The company dis-
charged employees who failed to report the following morning. 
Actually, these employees had gone on strike, although the com-
pany believed that they were working and at the same time refus-
ing to obey the company's rules. The question thus was whether 
the company could discharge employees whom it believed to be 
partial strikers while, in fact, the employees were engaged in a 
legitimate total strike. Both the Board and the Fourth Circuit 
agreed that the employees could not be discharged if they were 
actually on a full strike.26 The court added, however, that the com-
pany had a right to discharge the employees if they were engaged 
only in a refusal·to abide by the company's reporting rules. In the 
court's words, "the statute [section 7] expressly recognizes the 
right.of employees to 'engage in concerted activities' but does not 
and could not confer upon them the right ... to defy the authority 
of the employer to manage his business while remaining in his serv-
ice." 
In Aurora Wall Paper Mill, lnc.,27 employees refused to un-
load a railroad car, a minor and infrequent aspect of their job, in 
an effort to induce their employer to increase the rate of pay for 
24 Id. at 496. 
25 69 N.L.R.B. 32 (1946), affd. (4th Cir. 1947) 159 F. (2d) 280. 
26 Compare Underwood Machinery Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 641 (1947), where the Board found 
that the employer had not violated the act in taking reasonable disciplinary action against 
employees whom he mistakenly believed to have engaged in a slowdown. 
27 73 N.L.R.B. 188 (1947). · 
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such work. At the same time, they performed all the other duties 
of their job. When one of the employees persisted in this refusal 
to unload on the following day, he was discharged. The Board 
sustained the discharge, apparently on the ground that this was an 
insubordinate and unwarranted violation of company regulations 
and on the further ground that the employer had not by such 
action foreclosed collective bargaining. The inaction of the em-
ployees in this and the Mongomery Ward cases seems quite similar. 
Yet, the Board arrived at different results in each case. As sug-
gested by another writer, the distinction would seem to lie in the 
fact that in the Aurora case the essence of the employees' conduct 
was solely the flouting of managerial authority while in M ontgom-
ery Ward the employees' conduct in refusing to substitute on 
"struck work" was a traditional trade union response, which only 
incidentally involved a flouting of managerial authority.28 
The Board Follows the Courts 
These court rulings, illustrating an almost total divergence in 
viewpoint between the courts and the Board, had a decided in-
fluence on Board thinking. Since the mid-forties the Board has 
retreated far from its original position on partial strikes. In the 
process, an ever-widening area of partial strike tactics has been 
placed outside the protection of the act. The enactment of the 
1947 Taft-Hartley amendments preserved the general principle 
that employees engaging in concerted activities do not thereby 
always gain immunity from employer discipline or discharge. The 
Board itself stated: "There is an area of employee activity, not 
precisely defined, which, while not constituting [union] unfair 
labor practices under Section 8 (b) of the Act, is nevertheless not 
protected by the Board when employees seek affirmative relief 
themselves under Section 8 (a)."29 
Slowdowns 
First, the Board ruled that slowdowns were not a protected 
concerted activity under section 7 of the act. In Elk Lumber Co.30 
the employer changed a loading operation which in turn necessi-
tated the introduction of an hourly rate of pay for the loaders in 
place of the previously prevailing incentive system. The employees 
28 See Kelsey, "Partial Strikes," NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON 
LABOR 291 (1953). 
29 Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 at 241 (1948). 
30 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950). 
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were dissatisfied with their hourly rate and decreased their load-
ing speed. They told the employer that they would work at a 
slower speed unless he either increased the hourly rates or re-
turned to the piecework system. Shortly thereafter they were dis-
charged. In sustaining the discharges, the Board held that while 
the employees' conduct amounted to concerted activity, it was 
not entitled to the protection of the act. The Board made this 
forceful statement: 
" ... the test [citing UAW-AFL v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245 
(1949)] .. -. is whether the particular activity involved is so 
indefensible as to warrant the employer in discharging the 
participating employees. Either an unlawful objective or the 
adoption of improper means of achieving it may deprive em-
ployees engaged in concerted activities of the protection of. 
the Act. 
" ... To achieve [a lawful] ... objective, however, they 
adopted the plan of decreasing their production to the amount 
they considered adequate for the pay they were then receiv-
ing. In effect, this constituted a refusal on their part to accept 
the terms of employment set by their employer without engag-
ing in a stoppage, but to continue rather to work on their own 
terms. The Courts, in somewhat similar situations; have held 
that such conduct is justifiable cause for discharge."31 
Two years later, the Board in Phelps Dodge Copper Products 
Corp.32 affirmed and extended the above holding. Here the 
employees engaged in a slowdown during the course of negotia-
tions for a new contract. The Board held that the employer not 
only was free to discharge such employees but also was under no 
obligation under section 8 (a) (5) of the act to bargain with the 
union for the duration of the slowdown. In thus further limit-
ing the effectiveness of a slowdown, or indc;ed, of any partial strike, 
the Board said: 
" ... The Union was unwilling to choose between work-
ing under the existing terms of employment and engaging in 
a total strike with the loss of wages and the risk of lawful re-
placement incident thereto. Instead it engaged in a harassing 
tactic irreconcilable with the Act's requirement of reasoned 
discussion in a background of balanced bargaining relations 
upon which good faith bargaining must rest .... [T]he 
31 Id. at 337. 
32101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952). 
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authorized slowdown negated the existence of honest and sin-
cere dealing in the Union's contemporaneous request to nego-
tiate. In these circumstances, the . . . [employer] was not 
required to indulge in the futile gesture of honoring the 
Union's request."33 
Refusals to Cross Picket Lines 
87 
One final and important line of cases is noteworthy. These 
concern employee refusals to cross picket lines.34 Unlike the 
partial strikes previously discussed, where an employee refuses to 
cross a picket line at other than his own plant, he generally is 
seeking neither to change his conditions of employment nor to 
bring economic pressure on his employer. In another sense, a 
refusal to cross a picket line is in no way different from a refusal 
to perform specific work. For each involves an insubordinate 
refusal by the employee to perform some of the work assigned him. 
Yet, the Board itself drew a clear line between these different types 
of activity. The former refusal has been held protected, the latter 
unprotected. The Board consistently ruled that an employer may 
not discharge an employee who refuses to perform those parts 
of his job which require him to cross a picket line.35 In so hold-
ing, the Board found such employee refusals to be a protected 
form of concerted activity. In one case, Rockaway News,36 al-
though repeating that no discharge was warranted, the Board 
added that the employer's remedy under such circumstances was 
to require the employee either to perform all his duties or to 
vacate his job and thus make possible the hiring of a replacement. 
The Board spoke of the employer's right to force such an em-
ployee to become an economic striker "as a normal incident of 
its sright to maintain its operations." This distinction by the 
Board saved for employees important substantive rights. For the 
economic striker is entitled to reinstatement if he makes an un-
conditional offer to return to work before a permanent replace-
ment is hired; while the lawfully discharged employee has no 
right to reinstatement. 
33 Id. at 368. See Valley City Furniture Co., ll0 N.L.R.B. 1589 (1954), where the 
Board discontinued the employer's bargaining obligation while the employees refused to 
work the scheduled overtime hours. 
34 A recent comprehensive discussion of this subject was undertaken by O'Connor, "Re• 
specting Picket Lines: A Union View," NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SEVENTH ANNUAL CON· 
FERENCE ON LABOR 235-274 (1954). 
35 For example, Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 88 N.L.R.B. ll71 (1950); de Cordova & 
Bro., 91 N.L.R.Il. 1121 (1950); West Coast Casket Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 820 (1951). 
36 Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951). 
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The courts, however, were again unsympathetic to the Board's 
viewpoint.37 The Second Circuit in Rockaway News held that 
the employee who refused to cross a picket line at another plant 
was properly discharged and that the distinction between the right 
of discharge and the right of replacement drawn by the Board was 
"wholly unrealistic." More important, the Court found this re-
fusal to be a concerted activity unprotected by section 7 of the 
act. In this regard, the court, citlng the Conn and Montgomery 
Ward cases, said: 
". . . In other words an employee is of course free to 
exercise his right to refuse to cross a picket line when he is 
on his own time and his discharge for so doing would doubt-
less be a violation of Section 8 (a) (1). But he is not free to 
exercise the right during his working time in violation of 
his employer's working rules by refusing to perform that part 
of his regular duties which requires him to cross the picket 
line. To hold otherwise would be to permit an employee 
unilaterally to dictate the terms of his employment which it 
is well settled he may not do."38 
The Supreme Court decided the above case upon entirely 
different grounds - the discharge was proper because the em-
ployee's conduct had amounted to violation of a "no-strike" clause 
in a collective bargaining agreement. By way of dictum, however, 
the Court did approve of the above reasoning by the Second Cir-
cuit. It too found "the distinction between discharge and re-
placement in this context ... [to be] unrealistic and unfounded 
in law .... "39 
The reason for this difference in approach between the Board 
and the courts is apparent. Respect for picket lines has tradi-
tionally been a far more acceptable type of activity than slow-
downs and other insubordinate refusals to work. Such respect 
is a conventional means of sympathetic expression between union-
ists and usually is not a deliberate and pre-conceived violation of 
plant rules and regulations. As the refusal to cross a picket line 
conforms to a traditional norm, the Board refused to regard it 
87 See, e.g., NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., (7th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 124, 
denying enforcement of 88 N.L.R.B. 1171; NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., (2d Cir. 
1952) 197 F. (2d) 111, affd. on different grounds 345 U.S. 71, 73 S.Ct. 519 (1953). Some 
courts did agree with the Board theory. See, e.g., NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., (9th 
Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 902; NLRB v. Montag Bros., Inc., (5th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 730, 
affirming Montag Bros., Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 366 (1943). 
88 NLRB v Rockaway News Supply Co., (2d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) Ill at 113-114. 
89 NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 at 75, 73 S.Ct. 519 (1953). 
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as an "indefensible" activity and granted it the protection of the 
act. These factors were much more meaningful to an agency 
steeped in labor relations history and expertise than to any court. 
But that protected status, in face of the Rockaway News decisions, 
was to be short lived. 
The New Board and Partial Strikes 
The change in the Board's composition wrought by the 1952 
national elections has resulted in no startling decisions in this 
area. Even the new members' predecessors were unanimous in 
characterizing various partial strikes as unprotected activity. It 
came as no surprise when the present Board extended the con-
cept of the unprotected partial strike to include week-end strikes, 
overtime strikes and hit-and-run strikes.40 In doing so it merely 
followed the trend which had been forcefully stated by both the 
courts and the previous Boards. If there should be any criti-
cism of this trend it must therefore be directed not at any par-
ticular Board but rather at all the Boards. 
A few innovations in theory were made. The Board reversed 
its previous position on refusals to cross picket lines and in effect 
held such refusals to be partial strikes outside the protection of 
the act. The Board further determined new legal consequences 
which will hereafter attach to the unprotected partial strike. 
Moreover, it has been made abundantly clear that all partial strikes 
are now unprotected. There is no longer any possibility that 
this Board will indulge in serious distinctions between different 
varieties of partial strikes. Such distinctions can be made but 
whether or not they would be real and meaningful is an arguable 
matter, one which I would prefer exploring in greater detail in 
my conclusion. Thus, the only remaining query is a factual one 
- did the employees engage in a partial strike? If so, only one 
result is possible. 
Surely, the Board's recent Auto Parts case41 must be consid-
ered an important policy decision. There, an employer was 
held free to discharge an employee who refused to cross a picket 
line in performing his work assignment. In the Board's view, 
the employee's conduct amounted to a refusal to do the job for 
which he had been hired and a direct disregard of his employer's 
40 The Board's previous position on the slowdown as an unprotected partial strike 
was affirmed recently in California Cotton Cooperative, llO N.L.R.B. 1494 (1954). 
41107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953). 
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instructions. It concluded that, there being no anti-union bias 
on the part of the employer, his action was intended only to pre-
serve the efficient operation of his business. Now here does the 
decision classify this employee conduct as either protected or un-
protected activity. In effect, however, the Board here ruled that 
respecting picket lines is a partial strike and is accordingly out~ 
side the protection of section 7. No other interpretation would 
be realistic. 
Quite understandably, the majority of the Board's recent work 
in this area has dealt with intermittent work stoppages. As al-
ready mentioned, in Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co.42 the 
CW A's strategy consisted of "a multiplicity of little 'hit-and-run' 
work stoppages . . . to 'harass the company into a state of con-
fusion' ... [by a] period of calculated unpredictability." Rely-
ing on the Supreme Court's decision in UAW-AFL v. WERB, 
the Board held that "the inherent character of the method used 
sets this strike apart from the concept of protected union activity 
. envisaged by the Act," and, more specifically, that the CW A 
intended to "bring about a condition that would be neither strike 
nor work." No detailed examination of the vice in such a strike 
. was attempted. The Board concluded that employees affiliated 
· with a different union (Tollmen) who refused to cross the cyv A 
picket lines, with knowledge of their intermittent character, made 
common cause with the CWA and thus joined in the unprotected 
strike. The temporary layoffs of the tollmen were sustained, 
primarily on the ground that the company was motivated only 
by economic considerations in effectuating the layoffs but also on 
the further ground that, even assuming discriminatory motivation, 
these employees were outside the protection of the act. The novel 
feature of this holding is that a refusal to cross the picket line 
of unprotected strikers was itself considered unprotected. Em-
ployees hereafter respect picket lines at their own risk. For such 
respect is tantamount to association, the guilt or innocence of 
which will tum on the conduct of the picketing union. The 
Board did not and could not consider this refusal to cross a picket 
line to be a partial strike for the tollmen performed none of their 
duties. The refusal was unprotected only because the underlying 
"hit-and-run" stoppages were unprotected partial strikes. 
Then, in Kohler Company,43 the Board affirmed its trial 
examiner without comment. The latter had ruled that stoppages 
42 107 N.L.R.B. 1547 at 1548-1549, Member Murdock dissenting. 
43108 N.L.R.B. 207 (1954). 
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during four successive shifts in protest of over-heated working 
conditions amounted to an unprotected partial strike. 
The next problem was an obvious outgrowth of the above 
cases. In order to characterize this kind of partial strike as un-
protected activity, is it necessary to find that it is both intermit-
tent and unpredictable in nature? The Board and the courts had 
emphasized both elements. Would intermittency alone support 
a conclusion that such a strike was unprotected? The answer 
was soon forthcoming. In two companion cases, the Board found 
that an intermittent work stoppage was unprotected without 
regard to its predictability. Moreover, the fact that these partial 
strikes were, unlike some of the previous cases, designed to en-
force specific demands was also held to be without significance. 
In the Valley City Furniture Company case,44 already dis-
cussed, the union engaged in an overtime strike. That is, the 
employees refused to work the overtime hours set by the employer 
and actually engaged in one such stoppage. The majority char-
acterized this conduct as an unprotected partial strike and held 
that the participating employees could be replaced. And the fact 
that the partial strike was provoked by employer unfair labor 
practices did not make it a protected strike. The Board went on 
to say: 
"The vice in such a strike derives from two sources. 
First, the Union sought to bring about a condition that 
would be neither strike nor work. And, second, in doing so, 
the Union in effect was attempting to dictate the terms and 
conditions of employment. Were we to countenance such a 
strike, we would be allowing a union to do what we would 
not allow any employer to do, that is to unilaterally deter-
mine conditions of employment." 
Even more important was the Board's ruling that the employer's 
duty to bargain is suspended during the existence of a union 
threat to engage in a partial strike. The Board so held even 
though no stoppage had taken place. This unique holding was 
properly criticized by the dissenting members who believed that 
any such suspension of the duty to bargain was premature. The 
dissent wisely maintained that such threats should stimulate bar-
gaining because at such times negotiations might be the only 
means of preventing the materialization of an unprotected strike. 
44 110 N.L.R.B. 1589 at 1594-1595 (1954), Members Murdock and Peterson dissenting. 
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In their own words, "to sanction a refusal to bargain [in these 
circumstances] is to insure the outbreak of economic warfare." 
In Honolulu Rapid Transit Co.45 a series of weekend stop-
pages by bus drivers were found to be unprotected partial strikes. 
The company meted out one-day and fifteen-day suspensions to 
the drivers participating in these strikes. The Board stated that 
"the employer may lawfully insist that the employees choose either 
of the two avenues available to them - either quit work or dis-
charge the obligations for which they are hired and paid." 
The most interesting feature of this case, however, was the 
attempt by the concurring voices - Chairman Farmer46 and Mem-
ber Peterson - to inject a new and, I think, untenable theory in 
this area. In defining unprotected activity, they felt that the 
Board must "accommodate the right of employees to engage in 
concerted action to the right of the employer to continue his busi-
ness." Specifically, they suggested that the nature of an employ-
er's "response" to a partial strike will determine his guilt. Where 
that "response" is "retaliatory in motivation or effect," the con-
curring members would find a violation of the act; where that 
"response" is not retaliatory, they would find no violation. Thus, 
discharges of partial strikers might not be privileged where under 
similar circumstances layoffs of such strikers would be privileged. 
Dissenting Member Murdock's incisive analysis of this theory bears 
quotation: 
"In other words, a small amount of discrimination to dis-
courage union activity converts what would otherwise be pro-
tected activity into unprotected activity! . . . These state-
ments . . . present a new and dangerous concept in the in-
terpretation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. In effect, they 
add up to the conclusion that discrimination by an employer 
will be exonerated by this Board if the Board believes such 
discrimination is 'reasonable'. . . . [This] amounts to an ob-
vious form of administrative legislation."47 
I, for one, agree with Member Murdock, and apparently Members 
Rodgers and Beeson (respectively, the dissenting and majority 
opinions in this case), that the protection afforded employees by 
section 7 of the act is dependent solely on the nature and the 
45 110 N.L.R.B. 1806 (1954), Member Murdock dissenting. 
46 The Chairman urged the very same position in his concurring opinion in Valley 
City Furniture, note 44 supra. 
47 110 N.L.R.B. 1806 at 1817 (1954). 
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objective of their concerted activity, not on the nature of the em-
ployer's retort to that activity. 
One further comment should be made. In all of these recent 
cases, the tendency has been to find not only that the strike was 
an unprotected activity but also that the employer's response to 
such strike was primarily calculated to protect his right to con-
tinue his business. Such has been the case where the employer 
laid off, suspended, replaced and even discharged employees who 
were engaged in a partial strike. Reading these cases, it becomes 
difficult to conceive of a factual context in which the Board would 
find employer retaliation against partial strikers. For it must be 
remembered that even the rankest discriminations are in part 
motivated by the employer's effort to keep his business going. 
Thus, the attempt to distinguish factually between employer 
retaliation and employer self-protective measures will prove to 
be no more than an exercise in semantics. Indeed, a few mem-
bers of the Board seem to have formulated, sub silentio, some 
kind of presumption. Evidently, employer responses are pre-
sumed to be privileged exercises of the right to continue his busi-
ness, unless convincing evidence of retaliatory motive is estab-
lished. This subtle use of presumptions is more manifest in other 
recent Board decisions.48 Practically speaking, the above approach 
is identical with the view that partial strikers are unprotected 
for all purposes. Both theories arrive at the same result - that 
employer action against partial strikers is not violative of the act. 
Another significant case requires mention. In Personal Prod-
ucts Corporation49 the Board unanimously held that a union re-
fused to bargain in good faith, in violation of section 8 (b) (3), 
when it engaged in "unprotected harassing tactics" during nego-
tiations. The tactics found to be evidence of bad faith on the 
part of union included slowdowns, intermittent stoppages, and a 
refusal to work special hours or overtime. The Board said: 
" ... Such unprotected harassing tactics were an abuse of 
the Union's bargaining powers-'irreconcilable with the Act's 
requirement of reasoned discussion in a background of bal-
anced bargaining relations upon which good-faith bargain-
ing must rest' - which impaired the process of collective bar-
gaining that Congress intended not only to encourage but to 
protect."50 
48 See Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954). 
40 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954). 
50 Id. at 746-747. 
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Generalizing from this decision, it now seems apparent that any 
form of partial strike during negotiations is not only unprotected 
but also evidence of unlawful conduct. 
Conclusion 
A summary of these holdings can be simply stated. For the 
Board has taken a position which makes possible generalization 
with regard to partial strikes. Without exception, the Board will 
consider all partial strikes outside the protection of section 7 of 
the act. Employers will therefore have the right to suspend, dis-
cipline and, perhaps, discharge partial strikers without fear of 
committing unfair labor practices, although a few members have 
some reservations here on the limits of employer retaliation against 
such strikers. 
The theory behind these Board and court holdings has evi-
dently been that partial strikes are so "indefensible" in nature 
that Congress could not possibly have intended to protect such 
activities under section 7 of the act. This is a policy level de-
cision as to which little guidance can be found in the act itself. 
In justifying its position, the Board has had three principal ideas 
in mind: (1) that partial strikes create a condition that is neither 
strike nor work; (2) that partial strikers unilaterally attempt to 
set their own terms and conditions of employment; and (3) that 
an element of industrial insubordination is implicit in most par-
tial strike situations. These ideas are further buttressed by the 
fact that partial strikes clearly depart from the traditional norm 
of union strike activity. 
This theory is unquestionably applicable to some of the partial 
strikes. For example, slowdowns and refusals to perform specific 
work, regardless of their objectives, are tactics which primarily 
defy the employer's control over the conduct of employees while 
at work. These employees refuse to perform part of their duties 
while remaining on the employer's payroll and on his premises. 
The resulting situation is neither strike nor work. Surely, to af-
ford the protection of section 7 to such partial strikers would be 
to mock the policy objectives of the act. This type of conduct 
clearly deviates from most conceptions of traditional union activ-
ity and it can hardly be considered anything other than "inde-
fensible." 
The refusal to cross a picket line is identical to the refusal to 
perform specific work in most respects. Thus, it is understand-
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able why the Board has in effect concluded that the former refusal, 
like the latter, is an unprotected partial strike. But there are 
differences. Respect for picket lines has been a conventional re-
sponse by trade unionists for such a long period of time that it 
has become imbedded in tradition and has won much popular 
acceptance as a reasonable tactic. These factors have led some to 
argue, logical considerations aside, that section 7's protective cloak 
should cover the refusal to cross a picket line. One commentator 
persuasively elaborated as to how the employee who respects a 
picket line differs from other partial strikers: 
"First of all, the employee is reacting, not acting. He is 
merely a passive agent, not an active one. Second, he is act-
ing in a traditional union manner, which takes on a certain 
propriety by virtue of its lengthy history, and its acceptance 
as part of our nation's mores. The activities condemned in 
the partial strike cases enjoy no such status in our culture. 
Third, in respecting picket lines, there is but one form of 
concerted activity open to the employee. This is not true in 
the other cases for there the employees are afforded many 
means of handling their grievances. "51 
These arguments have been to no avail. .And the Board stands 
on the very brink of declaring this conduct to be "indefensible" 
and thus unprotected activity. 
Should intermittent work stoppages be similarly characterized 
as "indefensible"? This question has caused some controversy. 
These stoppages differ significantly from the other varieties of 
partial strikes mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. For they 
do not take place on company premises and do not anticipate pay 
for time not worked. It is also clear that such a stoppage cannot 
be equated with the situation where employees simultaneously 
strike and work. In other words, the phases of strike and of work 
are here separated in point of time. Surely, the intermittent stop-
page is not tantamount to insubordination. It does, however, in 
a real sense result in the employees' setting up their own hours of 
employment. Whether or not these distinctions are real and 
substantial is a vital question. If they are, then it would appear 
that the Board was too precipitate in classifying all partial strikes 
as unprotected activities. 
51 O'Connor, "Respecting Picket Lines," NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SEVENTH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR 274 (1954). 
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The United States Supreme Court said that unannounced and 
unpredictable intermittent stoppages for unstated ends were un-
protected. 52 Did thismean-that all intermittent stoppages were 
unprotected? Even those which were announced and predictable 
and for stated, lawful objectives? The Board so extended the Su-
preme Court's holding, finding the distinctions between intermit-
tent stoppages and other partial strikes to be without substance 
and finding all intermittent stoppages to be unprotected concerted 
activities. The Board's action was not taken without a dissenting 
voice. Member Murdock in one case expounded his belief that 
a regular weekend bus strike for stated objectives is not so inde-
fensible as to deprive employees of their guaranteed protections 
under section 7.53 He further asked: 
"Is it absurd to find that employees who engage in peace-
ful weekend strikes rather than a continuous strike are entitled 
to the protection of sections 7 and 8 of the Act? Have these 
employees engaged in such indefensible conduct that Con-
gress could not possibly have intended to protect them?" 
His rhetorical questions required no reply. So, too, in another 
case, Member Murdock stated that the question of whether unpre-
dictable "hit-and-run" stoppages were unprotected "is a close 
one."54 While he felt that that question need not be decided, he 
did argue that these stoppages were less objectionable than "a wild-
cat or a sit-down strike," or other forms of partial strikes. 
In questioning the validity of the Board's conclusion some 
other observations are certainly in order. In a dynamic indus-
trial environment, unions are constantly forced to discover more 
effective means of administering their affairs. Union policy must 
be responsive, for example, to changes in the economy, to new 
technological developments, and to changing industrial practices. 
So, the level of employment, the degree of automation, and the 
interrelation of companies in -a particular· industry may all be 
factors which influence and shape a unfon's strike policy. Take 
automation as an illustration. As already noted, in certain indus-
tries this phenomenon may strengthen employer ability to with-
stand traditional strike pressures. Faced with a loss in effective-
ness of their principal weapon, unions understandably will seek 
and create workable alternatives. The partial strike, particularly 
-52 UAW-AFL v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949). 
53 Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1806 at 1816 (1954). 
54 Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1954). 
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the intermittent stoppage, is one such alternative. Assuming the 
truth of the following premise - automation may in certain cir-
cumstances rebut traditional strike pressure - does the intermit-
tent stoppage then seem an "indefensible" tactic? I think not, at 
least not in every instance. This is especially true if one believes 
that the power to assert economic pressure, not necessarily its exer-
cise, is an indispensable condition and a basic encouragement to 
healthy collective bargaining. In other words, will collective bar-
gaining relationships be hindered by a union's inability to bring 
traditional strike pressure? If so, then should not new "untradi-
tional" strike techniques be stimulated by characterizing them as 
protected activities? I would think so if the act's objective of re-
storing, and presumably maintaining, "equality of bargaining 
power between employees and employers," and of "encouraging 
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining" is to have 
significance. I do not mean that union necessity alone justifies 
an otherwise indefensible strike tactic. No such position would 
be tenable. I mean only that for the above reasons it may well be 
that the intermittent stoppage is not always indefensible. 
An even clearer explanation of my point can be gained from 
a different perspective. The public's increasing impatience with 
utility strikes, as reflected by a sizeable increase in legislation in 
that field, will ultimately force utility unions to seek pressure de-
vices other than total strikes in attempting to win stalemated argu-
ments. Again the intermittent stoppage looms as an alternative. 
Indeed, in utilities this type of partial strike may be better for 
the community than a total strike. Should not the Board encour-
age the minimizing of disruptions in essential services? A strike 
one day a week is better than the suffocation of a total strike. In 
such circumstances, is an intermittent stoppage always "indefen-
sible"? I hardly think so. After all, one of the purposes of the act 
is "to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor 
disputes affecting commerce." Does the Board protect the public 
by discouraging intermittent stoppages which would lessen a 
strike's impact on the community? Member Murdock stated in one 
recent dissent in connection with weekend bus strikes: 
"Certainly, the public interest here was better served by 
a limitation of strike activity to nonessential weekend travel 
rather than continuing the strike throughout the week with 
serious disruption to the entire economic life of the city. The 
effect of the majority's decision in this case will be to serve 
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notice on transportation unions that they must strike con-
tinuously, without regard to the paralyzing consequences of 
their strike, to receive the protection of the Act."55 
An enlightened Board, I suggest, should consider giving some 
intermittent stoppages by utility u1:3-ions the protection of the act. 
The Board, "however, has shown little sympathy for this middle 
ground. Its rigid and mechanistic approach to this problem does 
not reflect a spirit of compromise and reasonableness which is the 
essence of good labor relations. To the contrary, it reflects a tech-
nical, perhaps even legalistic, frame of reference, all too remote 
from an appreciation of the changing needs in this field. Only in 
such a frame of reference can absolutes flourish. 
Yet, it must be acknowledged that there is some logic in the 
Board's position. Surely, all intermittent stoppages cannot be pro-
tected. The Supreme Court said this, but only in connection with 
unannounced stoppages for unstated ends. This does not mean 
that all announced stoppages for stated ends are to be protected. 
Even these stoppages can constitute such improper harassment as 
to be indefensible. For example, a stoppage of ten minutes every 
half-hour would create an intolerable situation under which pro-
duction of any kind would be unlikely. A stoppage of one day 
a week would hardly have the same effect and would not be sub-
ject to the same objections. Yet, these stoppages are different only 
in degree, not in kind. The problem is manifest. Is there any 
logic in protecting some intermittent stoppages and in no't protect-
ing others? Any such double standard would require the drawing 
of arbitrary lines between different types of intermittent stoppages 
on a case-by-case basis. Such a path has obvious administrative 
shortcomings. But the other path, taken by the Board, indicates 
that the efficiency and logic of neat formulas do not always pro-
duce a just result. 
What would the consequences be if the protection of the act 
were accorded some intermittent stoppages? To begin with, it 
would not result in a surrender by the employer of control over 
hours of work or other conditions of employment. While the em-
ployees were engaged in such a stoppage, they would be subject to 
replacement just like any other economic striker. And the em-
ployer could not be forced to continue to run his business in face 
of such continuing stoppages. In other words, he would have the 
55 Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., BO N.L.R.B. 1806 at 1815 (1954). Emphasis added. 
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right to convert a partial strike into a total strike. These are em-
ployer rights which the Board recognized years ago when it con-
sidered partial strikes to be protected. What the employer would 
not be allowed to do is discipline or discharge the employees be-
cause of their partial strike activity. To some, this may seem little 
advantage for the partial striker. But there is a considerable 
difference in Board law between being a protected economic 
striker and being an unprotected partial striker. Moreover, the 
unprotected partial strike suspends the employer's bargaining ob-
ligation. And the threat of such a strike has the very same effect. 
Clearly, the protection of the act would be a real benefit to a union 
using partial strike tactics. 
It should be emphasized that unions are still free to engage in 
any form of partial strike. The partial strike is unprotected, not 
unlawful ( except in the limited situation where the union uses 
these tactics during bargaining negotiations). The withdrawal of 
protection by the Board means only that the parties will be left 
to their own devices, free of federal interference. The parties are 
thus placed precisely where they would be without the Board. So 
viewed, the effects of existing policy will largely depend upon the 
relative strength of the union. The absence of protection will 
hardly deter a strong union from engaging in partial strike tactics. 
Many powerful unions find little need to resort to the Board. 
The weaker unions, to whom Board protection is often quite 
meaningful, will be wary of using this tactic. The partial strike 
will thus be no more effective than the union behind it. Today, 
partial strikers run the risk of almost any kind of employer retalia-
tion. To succeed, they must have a strength which is capable not 
only of winning the underlying argument behind the dispute but 
also of resisting any employer reprisal. 
In the final analysis, the announced intermittent stoppage may 
be an act of moderation. It is a self-imposed limitation on the 
union's maximum power, couched of course in terms of self-
interest. I believe there is good reason for considering some inter-
mittent stoppages to be protected concerted activity. Moreover, I 
believe that the concept of protected and unprotected activity 
should not be static. The Board's authority to classify concerted 
activities in one of these two categories is indeed significant. In 
doing so, the Board should be responsive to the changing con-
ditions of our industrial relations environment as well as the act's 
overall objectives. The Board has done this in other areas of the 
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law. For example, it gravitated from its initial (1937) strict pro-
scription of any employer anti-union speech to its recent (1954) 
almost unqualified approval of employer speechmaking. Different 
conditions warranted a change in the act's interpretation. Similar-
ly, an indefensible strike, in 1951 for instance, should not neces-
sarily be indefensible today. By the same token a strike which was 
held protected in the past need not be held protected today. Slavish 
adherence to precedent is not the answer. Rather the Board must 
in part evaluate strike tactics in light of the dynamic characteristics 
of our industrial life. If the Board will do this, I submit that it 
will find that not all intermittent work stoppages should be consi-
dered indefensible and thus unprotected activities. In any event, 
in important policy areas of this kind, it is best for the Congress 
itself to draw the guiding lines. Only in that way will this kind 
of partial strike escape from the present unprotected status in 
which both the Board and the courts have placed it. Perhaps in 
its next deliberations on amendments to the Taft-Hartley law, 
Congress will give this problem the searching examination it de-
serves. 
